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Correlation, Causality, Courts, Culture, and Continuity:
Does the U.S. Judiciary Instigate Social Change?

Dan Brook
All systems have both inputs and outputs. Systems also may receive feedback and be
limited by both institutional and extra-institutional constraints. Among other qualities and
characteristics, systems also have consumers. The judicial system is no different. The
reasons for or causes of judicial decisions correspond to the inputs of the system while
the decisions and policies, along with their impact and consequences, correspond to the
outputs of the system. Some of the constraints which restrict those decisions, on both
the input and output sides, include ideology, the nature and structure of the courts within
a hierarchical and federal system, the other branches of government, public opinion,
tradition, the cost of implementation, etc. Dworkin (1985, 70) contends that “if we give
up the idea that there is a canonical form of democracy, then we must also surrender
the idea that judicial review is wrong because it inevitably compromises democracy”.
Judicial decisions, though, are of less relevance altogether if the policies they proclaim
are not implemented.
Gerald Rosenberg, in The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
(1991), answers his subtitle with an emphatically resounding ”No”. Rosenberg (1991, 4)
defines social change as “policy change with nationwide impact”, with the implication
that it is progressive. If there is any qualification to Rosenberg’s answer, it is that under
certain specific and very infrequent circumstances, courts can effectively produce social
change. Rosenberg contends that for the courts to be able to produce social change
three “constraints” must be overcome and at least one of four “conditions” must be met.
The three constraints are the need for an edifice of legal precedent, the support of the
President and many members of Congress, and either citizen support from part of the
population or minimal opposition from the entire population. The four conditions, which
focus on implementation, are the existence of positive incentives, the reality of imposed
costs, the possibility of market implementation, and the use of court decisions as a
political tool to either extract additional resources or deflect political attacks (Rosenberg
1991, ch. 1). Considering the constraints and the conditions, on those relatively rare
occasions when the courts are able to bring about social change, they are not acting
alone. When the courts do act alone, they do not produce social change. Indeed,
Rosenberg argues that “court decisions are neither necessary nor sufficient for
producing significant social reform” (ibid., 35).
Rosenberg carefully examines five areas of law — civil rights, abortion and women’s
rights, the environment, reapportionment, and criminal law — to illuminate his argument.
In addition to his conclusions regarding courts and social change, Rosenberg’s findings
“also suggest that a great deal of writing about courts is fundamentally flawed” (ibid.,
342).

If we accept Rosenberg’s argument, then a large volume of the literature on judicial
politics, especially judicial review, must be seen in a different light. For if courts are
effectively unable to produce positive and meaningful change, especially as opposed to
the blocking of reform, then the study of how judicial decisions are made and what
impact they have, aside from on the litigants themselves, becomes less meaningful to
the social scientist. The U.S. judiciary is a locus of intense research because it is a coequal branch of government. In a dictatorship, the judiciary, if it exists, may be merely a
“rubber stamp” or “kangaroo court” and therefore unworthy of serious scholarly concern
in terms of judicial decision making; both the inputs and the outputs of such a court
system would directly correspond to those of the regime itself. Although the U.S.
judiciary is considered legitimate and does not operate within a dictatorship, Rosenberg
finds little evidence of its real power as a co-equal branch of government vis--vis social
change. In fact, he states that the “U.S. courts can almost never be effective producers
of significant social reform. At best, they can second the social reform acts of the other
branches of government. Problems that are unsolvable in the political context can rarely
be solved in the courts” (ibid., 338, original emphasis). On the other hand, Rosenberg
has demonstrated the possibility that the President, the Congress, and/or popular
mobilization have produced social change. For example, Rosenberg argues that Brown
neither led to school desegregation nor to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA). Yet, there
is reason to believe that various other social, cultural, political, and economic factors did
lead to the CRA. And it is that Act, not Brown, which seems to have directly led to
school desegregation, among other civil rights advances.
At the very least, Rosenberg has shifted the burden of proof regarding judicial power
back onto its claimants. Although Canon and Johnson (1984) agree that courts must
rely on other actors to translate their policies into action, they nevertheless believe that
the translation occurs, though sometimes in an indirect manner. In contrast to
Rosenberg, Canon and Johnson (1984, 269) conclude that “the courts have had and
will continue to have an important impact on U.S. society. On occasion they will initiate
fundamental changes in public policy”. A full ten years after Brown, very little
desegregation had occurred in southern schools; yet, Canon and Johnson (1984, 259)
claim that “the Court’s decision has on an overall basis been reasonably successful in
changing public policy and attitudes about racial equality”. They even go so far as to
state that Brown was a powerful symbol (it “worked its way into the minds of many
blacks, especially younger ones”) and, indirectly, led to both the sit-ins and the CRA
(Canon and Johnson 1984, 257-58). According to Rosenberg, assuming such a causal
connection is a incredible feat considering the facts that many blacks had never heard
of the decision and that most never mentioned the decision as their motivation for
action. In spite of their praise of empiricism, Canon and Johnson do not provide any
empirical support for these claims. In contrast, Rosenberg searches widely for empirical
evidence from social and political leaders to textbooks to song lyrics; however, he is
completely unable to find any. The burden of proof remains on Weberians (as opposed
to Durkheimians and Marxists) who believe that the structure of law and courts can
serve as agents of social change.1

While it is indeed true that the justices do not technically have to respond to “public
opinion, Congress, or the President”, Rosenberg indicates that if the mass public, many
of the congressional members, and the President do not respond to the justices, then
the Supreme Court’s decisions become effectively meaningless in substantive value
and essentially minimal in symbolic value. Decisions in and of themselves produce
neither policies nor outcomes; other actors are needed for the uncertain and uneven
process of implementation. The justices may be able to decide cases as they see fit, but
they may not be able to effect national policy changes, in spite of what they decide. It is
well accepted that judges and justices have the power of judicial review, and in
exercising it also proclaim policies. However, one cannot claim that judges make policy,
especially national policy, without giving evidence which supports a strong connection
between court decision and actual policy, in addition to ruling out plausible alternative
explanations. Despite the seduction of correlation, theories are only consummated by
evidence of causality.
Rosenberg, by implication, demands such evidence of causality and additionally insists
that meaningful policy change neither originates in nor is produced by the courts at any
level, whether at the base or at the pinnacle. Like the courts, any individual can declare
a policy. But also like the policy of the courts, that person’s new policy would only be a
paper tiger if the three constraints were not overcome and at least one of the four
conditions were not met  la Rosenberg. If the constraints were overcome and a
condition were met, with the new policy now in place, could anyone reasonably assert
that it was the individual who had made policy? The answer is clearly “No” for the
simple reason of an absence of causality. Rosenberg admits that the answer is less
clear for the courts in many people’s minds, yet the scenario is remarkably similar.
Again, Rosenberg cannot find any evidence of causation between court decisions and
meaningful policy change. Indeed, Rosenberg is even able to point to plausible
alternative explanations which may have given rise to the policy. With regard to civil
rights, for example, he cites “growing civil rights pressure from the 1930’s, economic
changes, the Cold War, population shifts, electoral concerns, [and] the increase in mass
communication” (Rosenberg 1991, 169). Rosenberg concludes that “[t]he Court
reflected that pressure; it did not create it” (ibid.). According to Rosenberg, there is no
reason to believe that Brown led to either desegregation or the CRA; yet, there are
several reasons to believe that the CRA would have materialized even in the absence of
the court decision. Still, then, the burden of proof remains on the side of those who
claim that the Court, through Brown, helped bring about racial equality.
We should not, therefore, concur with Nathan Glazer’s opinion regarding an “imperial
judiciary”. In support of Rosenberg’s thesis, O’Brien (1989, 464) maintains that “when
focusing on particular cases of judicial intervention in public policy and affairs, [Glazer
and others] fail to pay sufficient attention to broader yet more fundamental legal, socioeconomic, and political changes” in accounting for judicial power. The burden of proof is
still on Glazer and others who believe in an “imperial judiciary” to demonstrate that the
emperors do indeed wear more than their black robes.

Decades ago, Robert Dahl hypothesized about the Supreme Court’s role vis--vis
minorities. Supporting Dahl’s hypothesis that “the Court cannot and does not…function
to protect minorities”, Funston (1975, 795, 811) concludes that with regard “to the Court
qua institution: Its significance is essentially symbolic”. Rosenberg, of course, questions
even the Court’s symbolic (and indirect) power.
The Hollow Hope should remind us of the need to demonstrate causality rather than
assume it. Rosenberg also specifically questions the power of courts to bring about
social change in the areas of civil rights, abortion and women’s rights, the environment,
reapportionment, and criminal law. In doing so, he has shifted the burden of proof for
the existence of judicial power, whether substantive or symbolic, to the believers in and
theorists of that power. Following Rosenberg, judicial review is de facto reconciled with
democracy in that it does not effect fundamental issues.
It may be instructive, though, to step back and take counsel from Mather (1991). She
perceptively notes that “[i]n the final analysis, the answer to the question, Do…courts
make policy? depends simply on the definition of policy making used in the discussion,
since a narrow definition tends to deny…courts a significant policy making role while a
broader one does not” (Mather 1991, 123). Perhaps the burden is not one of proof, but
rather one of operationalization and conceptualization based on theory. That is, the way
in which we theoretically define power necessarily structures whether or not, and to
what extent, we find it to exist.
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